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Building Industrial Resilience with a Little Help from Our 
Friends: Adapting DoD Acquisition Processes to  
Facilitate Allied and Partner Engagement  
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Abstract 
This paper focuses on numerous existing and recent initiatives and programs involving allied and 
partner support to the U.S. defense industrial base and explores how they are currently 
instantiated in DoD acquisition processes. Are DoD acquisition processes able to effectively 
utilize efforts such as the National Technology Industrial Base (NTIB), Reciprocal Defense 
Procurement Agreements, Defense Production Act (DPA) Title III, and others to foster programs 
with partners that build industrial resilience in the defense industrial base? Research and 
interviews found that most of these efforts have promising foundations, but DoD acquisition 
processes need adaption to effectively increase allied and partner involvement. The author 
makes a series of recommendations to address these findings about the programs analyzed and 
the acquisition system itself. The author concludes that reframing acquisition processes and 
programs to better include partners and allies is ultimately a win-win proposition for all parties 
involved. Pursuing this approach will help to provide a concrete foundation for the future of 
international industrial collaboration and will build the industrial resilience needed to face the 
national security challenges of today and tomorrow. The paper also points to areas for further 
research to further refine the recommendations and explore specific areas in greater depth.  
Research Question 
This paper focuses on the numerous existing and recent programs and initiatives 
focused on building resilience in the U.S. defense industrial base and examines how current 
DoD acquisition processes support or hinder the involvement of allied and partner governments 
and companies. Specifically, there are a large number of existing and recent programs or 
initiatives that are designed, at least in part, to enable the involvement of companies based 
outside of the United States in U.S. defense acquisition programs. These efforts include 
Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreements, the National Technology Industrial Base (NTIB), 
Trusted Capital Marketplace (TCM), and Defense Production Act (DPA) Title III. How are these 
programs impacting DoD acquisition processes, and are close allies and partners able to 
effectively contribute to building resilience in the U.S. defense industrial base?  
Need for Increased U.S. Defense Industrial Base Capacity 
The annual Department of Defense (DoD) industrial capabilities report to Congress lays 
out key trends in the defense industrial base. To quote from the Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 report, 
“The defense industrial base is the key to preserving and extending U.S. competitive military 
dominance in the coming century and, with it, deterrence that will keep Americans safe and 
keep the peace” (DoD, 2021). This report and previous annual reports showed fragility at lower 
levels of the defense supply chain, workforce challenges, troubling trends in the sole sourcing of 
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materials such as rare earth elements and chemicals from China, and chronic weaknesses in 
areas such as microelectronics.  
China is the principal challenge as outlined in the current National Security Strategy 
(White House, 2017) and National Defense Strategy (DoD, 2019). These legacy documents 
from the Trump administration will change in priorities and focus under the Biden administration, 
but the new administration has made clear in its Interim National Security Strategic Guidance 
(White House, 2021) and other venues that a focus on China as the “pacing” national security 
challenge will remain (Shelbourne, 2021). 
China has co-opted the free market system for its purposes. Today, China is no longer 
focused on being the locus for low-cost manufacturing and is looking to move up the value chain 
and gain intellectual property. The Made in China 2025 strategic plan clearly demarcated the 
areas where Chinese companies and state-owned enterprises would invest (robotics, AI, 
autonomy, etc.) and the investment has followed (Sutter, 2020). The approach for this is 
multifaceted: from licit business transactions to illicit intellectual property theft. Moreover, the 
truth of the matter is that any Chinese company, under the 1993 state law, is compelled to 
provide information deemed important for national security to the Chinese government (Brown & 
Singh, 2018). 
 These industrial base concerns have led to a greater focus on reshoring industrial 
capabilities previously conducted overseas to domestic locations. This prioritization began in 
earnest after the whole of government review of the U.S. manufacturing and defense industrial 
base launched in July 2017 by Executive Order No. 13,806 (2017). This effort underscored 
similar themes found in earlier reports but with greater fidelity and detail. The recommendations 
coming out of the final report, released in September 2018, focused first and foremost on 
addressing industrial base weaknesses where the United States was reliant on Chinese single 
and sole sources in areas such as rare earth elements, specialty chemicals, and small 
unmanned aerial systems (Executive Order No. 13,806, 2017). 
DoD industrial base investment has concentrated on these and other priorities, but the 
concern about China has also led to an increased focus on Buy America efforts in some 
quarters. During 2020, for example, a congressional effort to expand Buy America in the 
FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) would have required 75% of Pentagon 
major defense acquisition programs to be procured solely from U.S. sources by 2021 and 100% 
by 2026. This provision would have obviated the industrial contributions by companies 
headquartered in allied countries, many of whom have significant U.S. subsidiaries (Greenwalt, 
2020). This Buy America approach undermines those close allies that support thousands of 
American jobs through the development and purchase of U.S. defense systems. Because of 
existing Buy America regulations and national security priorities, defense systems are already 
one of the strongest domestic manufacturing sectors. Eliminating key international suppliers, 
many of whom have significant U.S. physical and economic presence, from our defense 
industrial base is counterproductive. Moreover, these countries—mainly our NATO allies and 
close partners like Japan, Australia, and Israel—buy billions of dollars of U.S. defense systems 
each year (McGinn, 2020). 
Rather than excluding them, it is important to look at how partners and allies can 
contribute to efforts to building resilience in the U.S. defense industrial base.  
International Involvement in DoD Acquisition 
The principal objective of DoD acquisition system is to get the absolute best capabilities to meet 
U.S. warfighter needs. DoD programs do this primarily through contracting with U.S. companies 
large and small. However, given the global nature of technology in general and the aerospace 
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and defense business in particular, allied and partner governments and companies have been 
participating in DoD programs for decades. Participation occurs in three principal ways: (1) as a 
contributor to a program, (2) as a customer, and (3) as part of an international cooperative 
program. I will briefly discuss each in turn. 
International Contributions to DoD Programs 
The rationale for involving non-U.S. companies in DoD programs derives directly from 
the objective of the defense acquisition system. In some cases, the best technology or system 
for a program can be obtained from a non-U.S. source. The same goes for technology, 
subsystems, and components procured by U.S. prime integrators. Working as prime 
contractors, subcontractors, and suppliers, foreign sources have made significant contributions 
to the U.S. defense industrial base.  
In addition, many foreign companies have U.S.-based subsidiaries that manufacture 
products or conduct services for unclassified and classified DoD programs. For those 
conducting classified work, these subsidiaries operate under foreign ownership, control, or 
influence (FOCI) regulations governed by the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency, 
which limits communications and sharing of information between the parent company and the 
U.S. subsidiary (Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency, n.d.-a). Regardless, U.S.-
based subsidiaries of foreign-owned companies are considered U.S. companies for purposes of 
DoD acquisition. 
International Purchases of U.S. Systems 
The purchase of DoD systems by international customers through foreign military sales 
(FMS) or direct commercial sales (DCS) is another major avenue for international participation 
in DoD acquisition. FMS are conducted via government-to-government agreements overseen by 
the Department of State (State) and executed by the DoD through the Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency (DSCA), while DCS are conducted via government-to-industry 
competitions, and sales are licensed by State or the Department of Commerce under their 
respective export control regimes governing military or commercial dual-use items.  
U.S. international defense sales are significant and number in the tens of billions of 
dollars each year, but it is very difficult to track actual dollar expenditures associated with 
specific FMS and DCS transactions. This is because FMS are reported by DSCA in proposed 
letters of offer and acceptance that cite an “estimated” price for a “possible” sale (Defense 
Counterintelligence and Security Agency, n.d.-b). This is required under the U.S. Arms Export 
Control Act. DCS transactions, meanwhile, are reported by the purchasing governments and/or 
the U.S. company producing the system. The U.S. government reports the granting of an export 
license to authorize the sale of items via DCS, but the authorized value reported does not 
equate to a sale or the actual sale dollar amount (Department of State, 2021). The Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) provides the most comprehensive estimate of 
international transfer in its Arms Transfers Database (Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute, n.d.). 
International Cooperative Programs  
DoD International Cooperative Programs (ICPs) are acquisition partnership 
arrangements between the United States and foreign countries that are established via 
memoranda of understanding (MoU) or project agreements (PAs) that often combine both 
foreign government and foreign commercial source participation. ICPs began in the 1960s, most 
prominently with the NATO Sea Sparrow missile, and continue today (Kenlon, 2018). The 
largest ICP by far is the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, with eight countries initially participating in the 
program. Each country contributed various amounts to the research and development of the 
program, receiving in return various levels of participation (Gertler, 2020). Numerous other 
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major programs have ICPs, including the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS), P-8 
Maritime Patrol Aircraft, NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance, and SM-3 Block IIA. There have 
only been a few new major system ICPs established in the past decade, however (Kenlon, 
2018). 
International Impacts on the U.S. Defense Industrial Base 
These international contributions in DoD programs have both direct and indirect impacts on the 
U.S. defense industrial base: 
• Direct impacts. Many of these contributions have direct impacts on the health of the 
U.S. defense industrial base through employment and purchases. Specifically,  
o U.S. subsidiaries of foreign-headquartered firms employ tens of thousands of 
American workers through the production of systems and the performance of 
services in direct support of DoD programs. The United Kingdom (UK), for 
example, has estimated that U.S. subsidiaries of UK companies employ more 
than 56,000 U.S. personnel (Pierce, 2020). 
o The purchase of DoD systems by foreign government customers through FMS 
and DCS support the development and production of U.S. programs. Some 
programs, most notably the F-16 fighter, continue in production today solely 
because of these continued international sales.  
o ICPs such as the F-35, GMLRS, and P-8 support the continued production and 
product improvement of these U.S.-based programs. 
• Indirect impacts. Other international participation in DoD acquisition programs also 
have a more indirect impact on the U.S. defense industrial base. For example, 
o The purchase of foreign-produced subsystems and parts by DoD programs 
contribute to the production and sustainment of programs across the DoD 
enterprise. These contributions do not have a direct impact on U.S. jobs or 
facilities, but they do enable the successful performance of a program and 
therefore support the economic impact of the program over the acquisition life 
cycle. 
o Partnering relationships established by the DoD and U.S. industry with their 
foreign counterparts can lead to additional teaming in technology development 
and product improvement efforts beyond the scope of the original program, 
leading to expanded U.S. industrial base opportunities in the global defense 
marketplace.1 
Successes and Challenges 
There have been recent notable successes in the involvement of international-
headquartered firms in DoD programs. For example, Fincantieri Marinette Marine, the U.S. 
subsidiary of the Italian shipbuilding Fincantieri, won the Navy’s Future Frigate competition in 
April 2020. The company invested nearly $180 million in its Wisconsin facility over several 
years, which helped the company position for its win of this almost $800 million contract 
(Fincantieri Marinette Marine, 2020). In addition, in this year’s submission of proposals for the 
preliminary design phase of the U.S. Army’s Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV), three 
of the four announced bidders are led non-U.S. headquartered companies: BAE Systems 
(teamed with Elbit Systems of America), Rheinmetall (teamed with Raytheon Technologies and 
L3Harris), and Hanwha (teamed with Oshkosh; Callan, 2021). 
 
1. Thanks to Frank Kenlon for suggesting this impact.  
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In the regulatory space, the FY2019 NDAA created an exemption for NTIB entities in the 
United States operating under a special security agreement to not be required to obtain a 
national interest determination for access to proscribed information (John S. McCain National 
Defense Authorization Act [NDAA], 2018b). This streamlined the involvement of U.S. 
subsidiaries of NTIB countries performing highly classified programs for U.S. government 
agencies and was fully implemented in December 2020 (National Industrial Security Program 
Operating Manual [NISPOM], 2020). 
However, significant challenges remain. Most of these challenges are either cultural 
within the DoD acquisition system or are an artifact of existing acquisition practices and 
processes. For example, in the development of system requirements in many DoD programs, 
requirements documents are frequently classified as SECRET NOFORN (or higher). This 
requires non-U.S. companies to obtain DoD technology security and foreign disclosure 
authorizations to even engage in classified discussions with DoD program offices or formally 
respond to DoD contracting officer requests for information that have classified aspects. This 
hinders the ability of these companies to better understand program office needs at early stages 
in program requirements formulation. It can even prevent them from responding to or making 
them less competitive for eventual DoD solicitations.  
Even after winning a program, these types of challenges can continue. For instance, the 
intellectual property for a DoD program is designated U.S.-only. That is appropriate in most 
cases but can be problematic when a U.S. subsidiary is the prime. In the Navy’s Future Frigate 
program, Fincantieri Marinette Marine was not permitted to speak with the parent company 
engineers to discuss engineering challenges during the design stage. This created difficulties 
that could have been more easily addressed if they could have obtained a U.S. government 
export license that would have enabled the U.S. subsidiary to conduct authorized technical 
discussions with parent company engineers (R. Hunt, personal communication, April 2, 2021). 
Recommendations  
There are several ways that the DoD can educate acquisition professionals and adapt existing 
processes to facilitate greater involvement of partners and allies in DoD programs: 
• The DoD should promote current DoD 5000 series processes for incorporating allied and 
partner companies’ technologies and systems into DoD programs. 
• The DoD should improve the ability of acquisition professionals to develop requirements 
documents that facilitate the early involvement of allied and partner companies in DoD 
programs (e.g., avoid citing classified, U.S.-only documents in either informal or formal 
requests for information or solicitations where possible). 
• The DoD should facilitate communications between U.S. subsidiary firms performing on 
DoD contracts and their parent foreign firms in areas of engineering with direct impact on 
the conduct of the system being developed or fielded (e.g., working with U.S. 
government export control organizations to authorize appropriate engineer-to-engineer 
engagement throughout the program life cycle). 
• The DoD should reexamine its approach to ICPs to identify different types of cooperative 
opportunities leading to a new generation of programs in the coming years. 
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Existing and Emerging Initiatives and Programs 
Reciprocal Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy Memoranda of Understanding 
(RDP MOUs) 
Current Use 
There are currently 26 countries that have RDP MOUs with the United States (Defense Pricing 


























• United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
These MOUs establish agreed upon procurement principles that foster transparency and 
openness to competition in each country’s respective defense marketplace.  
The largest tangible benefit for the non-U.S. signatory countries is that they are waived 
from Buy America provisions when competing for DoD programs (DFARS 225.872-1, 2021). 
The existence of this exemption is often not well recognized in some program offices or on 
Capitol Hill, and others are opposed to these exemptions in the first place, as described above. 
Moreover, the Buy America focus of the current administration, which is directly at odds with its 
Interim National Security Strategy Guidance emphasis on strengthening relationships with allies 
and partners, sends conflicting signals to allies and partners (White House, 2021).  
In addition to its RDP MOU, Canada also has a Defence Production Sharing Agreement 
(DPSA), which guides defense trade procedures between the two allies (Canadian Commercial 
Corporation, n.d.). The DPSA is further codified within the U.S. Defense Federal Acquisition 
Regulation Supplement 225.870 (DFARS 225.870, 2021) and permits the Canadian 
Commercial Corporation to help Canadian firms compete for DoD opportunities.  
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Potential Future Uses 
There is a clear lack of awareness of the RDP MOUs and what they mean for DoD 
acquisition and for strengthening the defense industrial base. More detailed analysis of the 
impact of the presence and spending of RDP MOU countries, for example, would help to 
explicate the benefits of allied participation in DoD acquisition. This analysis would assist in 
educating acquisition professionals, DoD officials, and congressional staff and members about 
these tangible benefits. This could also spur greater involvement in DoD programs, leading to 
more investment as well as economic and national security benefits. In addition, written 
statements by the Biden administration on their support for RDP MOUs would go a long to 
reassure signatory countries.  
Recommendations 
• The administration would be well served to formally articulate their support for RDP 
MOUs as part of their emphasis to strengthen relationships with allies and partners. 
• The DoD or Congress should request an analysis of the impact of RDP MOU countries’ 
contributions to the U.S. defense industrial base through participation in DoD programs 
and the purchase of U.S. defense systems through foreign military or direct commercial 
sales. 
• The DoD should work to increase awareness of and educate acquisition professionals 
across the services about the Buy America exemption for RDP MOU countries as well 
as the Canadian DSPA DFARS clause to help spur additional competition and 
innovative solutions in the U.S. defense industrial base. 
Security of Supply Arrangements  
Current Use 
There are currently 9 bilateral Security of Supply Arrangements (SoSAs) between the United 










• United Kingdom 
Not surprisingly, all of the SoSAs are with RDP MOU countries. These arrangements 
implement part of the Declaration of Principles in the RDP MOUs and recognize the “mutual 
interdependence of supplies needed for national security” as well as calling for the signatories to 
“explore solutions for achieving assurance of supply” (Industrial Policy, n.d.-b). Some of the 
signatory nations have established industry codes of conduct as a measure of reliance of their 
respective industry partners to support defense priorities.  
The most telling part of these efforts, however, is the fact that they are arrangements, 
not agreements. That underscores the relatively informal and voluntary nature of these bilateral 
initiatives. There arrangements are confidence-building measures, and there is value in that, but 
they are not formal commitments by the respective government signatories. Thus, it is not 
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surprising that these arrangements have not been invoked directly in any specific case to date 
(Hasik, 2021). 
Potential Future Uses 
It is time to reexamine SoSAs and their use for today’s national security challenges. 
They can continue to be utilized as confidence building measures, but the United States and 
signatory nations should also consider methods for strengthening them. For example, the DoD 
could explore ways to partner with countries on mutually beneficial efforts through SoSAs. An 
arrangement with Japan for microelectronics and arrangements with Brazil and India for 
chemicals, for instance, could strengthen industrial capacities in those critical areas.  
Recommendation 
• The DoD should conduct a review of SoSAs with partner countries to determine the 
future of SoSAs, specifically how these (and any future) arrangements could be adapted 
to make them more relevant for today’s global industrial security challenges. 
National Technology Industrial Base  
Current Use 
The NTIB has deep roots. Initially born out of the North American Technology and 
Industrial Base Organization (NATIBO; Government of Canada, n.d.), the NTIB was first 
codified in law in 1992. At that time, Congress required the DoD to report annually on “steps to 
foster and safeguard” the NTIB. The NTIB was defined at the outset to include the United States 
and Canada (Hunter et al., 2017). NATIBO conducted periodic bilateral studies on industrial 
base issues, but neither NATIBO nor NTIB gained significant visibility (or impact) until the NTIB 
was expanded to include Australia and the United Kingdom in the 2017 National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA, 2016).  
The expansion of the NTIB brought greater attention to the need to increase industrial 
cooperation between these key allies (Greenwalt, 2019). The NTIB countries established an 
initial governance structure and identified areas for initial focus. The increased dialogue has 
been favorably viewed by the NTIB governments, but the NTIB made an immediate impact in 
area of foreign direct investment (FDI).  
Prior to 2010, for example, the vast majority of FDI in the United States came from allied 
and partner countries. In less than a decade, those ratios shifted dramatically. From 2016 to 
2018, transactions originating from China were the largest proportion of cases filed: 26.5%. 
Moreover, the nature of the Chinese transactions drew increased scrutiny because the vast 
majority of these proposed acquisitions (84%) were focused on the manufacturing, finance, 
information, and services sectors (Department of the Treasury, 2021). 
This shift drew significant bipartisan attention on the Committee on Foreign Investment 
in the United States (CFIUS), which reviews foreign transactions for national security concerns, 
and led directly to a significant strengthening of CFIUS authorities through the Foreign 
Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA; NDAA, 2018a). As the United 
States has strengthened its position on FDI, Chinese investment started to focus on other 
countries with advanced technology companies. Thus, NTIB governments have undertaken 
significant efforts to share best practices among NTIB countries to counter potential national 
security impacts. 
NTIB was also featured in the Executive Order 13,806 final report of the U.S. 
manufacturing and defense industrial base. The final report, published in October 2018, 
recognized the global nature of the defense industrial base and underscored the importance of 
allies and partners. For example, the broadening of the NTIB is cited favorably: “These types of 
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agreements [i.e., NTIB] with partners and allies provide economies of scale and scope, help 
facilitate cost-effective defense production, and increase Warfighter interoperability” (DoD, 
2018). 
Potential Future Uses 
The governments are focusing on NTIB governance and on sharing best practices in FDI 
and will continue to do that. What else can be done? Analysts such as William Greenwalt (2019) 
argue that the NTIB should be used to foster export control reform among member countries. 
While that goal is laudable, there has been little progress on this front since the NTIB 
expansion. One potential related area that could be promising to pursue is releasability. For 
example, when companies from NTIB countries are working with program executive offices and 
program offices, those offices sometimes establish releasability provisos on the program’s 
technology. These provisos require companies not based in the United States to file for an 
export license. That delays the time before a foreign company can examine technical data and 
speak at a technical level with a DoD customer for a potential or actual solicitation, thereby 
making them less competitive. Establishing releasability criteria at the outset to include 
appropriate NTIB-based companies, for example, could create opportunities for greater 
competition for DoD customers.  
The recently passed FY2021 NDAA had a provision that directed the DoD to establish 
criteria for expanding the NTIB to include additional countries (NDAA, 2021). This clearly 
indicates congressional intent to increase NTIB countries, and there have been numerous 
countries seeking to be part of the NTIB. As part of establishing any criteria for expansion, the 
DoD should look at creating specific opportunities for strengthening the ability of NTIB-based 
companies to contribute to the U.S. defense industrial base.  
An immediate opportunity for success is to create acquisition pathways for DoD projects 
and programs to employ NTIB-based companies that are able to provide leading edge 
technology and affordable solutions to emerging DoD requirements. A concrete way for the DoD 
to incentivize NTIB contributions to U.S. efforts to strengthen the defense industrial base, for 
example, would be to create opportunities for companies based in NTIB countries to compete 
for projects and programs by simply changing acquisition rules to incentivize DoD acquisition 
personnel to consider facilitating NTIB offerings at prime, subcontractor, and supplier levels. 
The DoD has started to do this to a modest degree. In a March 2019 memorandum to DoD 
acquisition officials, for example, then Acting Principal Director of Defense Pricing and 
Contracting Kim Herrington specifically recommended the “inclusion of” NTIB members in 
innovation-focused Other Transactions (OT) consortia (Herrington, 2019). Memos like this are 
useful to set the conditions for change, but the NTIB needs to be formalized through rule 
changes and DFARS clauses that can be deployed in solicitations and contracts. Once the rules 
are changed, education and training can help to expand opportunities for NTIB companies 
(McGinn, 2021). 
This education need also extends to industry. One of the biggest failures of the previous 
U.S.–UK and U.S.–Australian defense trade cooperation treaties, for example, is the fact that 
the governments did not get industry engaged early enough to incentivize companies to use the 
treaties. These treaties, approved by the U.S. Senate in late 2010, were designed to create a 
“trusted community” of companies that could share technology and compete for opportunities in 
this trusted community (Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, 2010). Unfortunately, they never 
realized their potential, and while they have been used for government-to-government efforts, 
they have almost never been used by industry.  
The NTIB provides an opportunity to do better, but the governments need to help create 
pathways where industry can see the potential business benefit. DoD and NTIB governments 
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can and should make the value proposition of NTIB clear to industry and then let the resulting 
business relationships grow and flourish. Industry will not always pursue these incentives, but 
there is 100% certainty that they will not pursue them in the absence of a clearly defined 
pathway to success.  
Recommendations 
• Conduct rule-making and establish DFARS clauses focused on facilitating NTIB 
participation and membership in opportunities such as OT consortia, DPA Title III, IBAS, 
and other appropriate programs. 
• Educate the acquisition workforce on the use of NTIB clauses for use in programs 
across the DoD. 
• Advertise these NTIB-inclusive opportunities to NTIB countries and trade associations to 
facilitate additional solutions to U.S. industrial base challenges. 
DPA Title III 
Current Use 
The Defense Production Act (DPA) is a long-standing authority that derives from the 
Korean War. Passed in 1950 and drawing on the War Powers Acts of World War II, the DPA is 
a broad set of authorities to help the U.S. government strengthen the defense industrial base to 
respond to national emergencies. Title III of the DPA is focused specifically on the expansion of 
productive capacity and supply and utilizes grants, loans, loan guarantees, purchases, and 
purchase commitments to build industrial capacity (Cecire & Peters, 2020). The DoD has been 
delegated authority to execute Title III projects and has used this authority for decades to 
expand industrial capacity in areas such as the creation of a domestic beryllium production 
facility to complex forgings for naval propulsion shafts (Air Force Research Library, 2013; 
Earmark Declaration, 2009). 
The COVID-19 pandemic response has put DPA Title III into overdrive. Where DPA 
annual appropriations fluctuated between $40 million and $100 million during the decade 
preceding the pandemic, $1 billion was appropriated for DPA Title III in the March 2020 CARES 
Act. The recently passed American Recovery Act dramatically upped the ante, appropriating 
$10 billion for current and future pandemic response that almost certainly will be allocated via 
DPA Title III (American Rescue Plan Act, 2021). The focus of these Title III projects is to 
increase domestic production capacity to reduce reliance on non-U.S. sources for items such as 
vaccine production, personal protective equipment (PPE), testing equipment, and so on. The 
primary focus is on reducing dependencies on Chinese sources, as COVID had exposed the 
dominant positions of China in areas such as PPE and antibiotics production (Bradsher & 
Alderman, 2020; Swanson, 2020). 
Potential Future Uses 
In efforts to reshore or onshore manufacturing capacity, one relatively unknown provision of the 
DPA defines the term domestic source as a business concern  
that performs in the United States or Canada substantially all of the research and 
development, engineering, manufacturing, and production activities required of 
such business concern under a contract with the United States relating to a critical 
component or a critical technology item. (Defense Production Act, 1950) 
This permits Canadian firms to apply for DPA Title III grants and for Title III projects to be 
conducted in Canada as well. This is a legacy of long-standing U.S.–Canadian industrial base 
collaboration in the Cold War North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and 
NATIBO (Hunter et al., 2017). Given the geographic proximity and the expertise of Canadian 
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industry in areas such as mining and chemicals, this could significantly benefit the U.S. defense 
industrial base. If the DPA were amended to include other NTIB countries in the definition of 
domestic source, this would substantially expand the opportunities for firms in Australia and the 
UK to contribute to strengthening the U.S. industrial base.  
Recommendations  
• The DoD and Canada should promote the ability for Canadian-based firms to contribute 
to DPA Title III projects. 
• The DoD should submit a legislative proposal to amend the DPA to include all NTIB 
countries to reflect the fact that they are already part of the U.S. industrial base and 
make their respective industrial capabilities available to strengthen that base. 
Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment Program 
Current Use  
The Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment (IBAS) program was established in 2014 
in the DoD to fund the mitigation of defense industrial base issues (Nelson, 2016). Defined in 10 
U.S.C. § 2508 (Industrial Base Fund, 2011), IBAS has four principal functions: 
(1) to support the monitoring and assessment of the industrial base … ; 
(2) to address critical issues in the industrial base relating to urgent operational needs; 
(3) to support efforts to expand the industrial base; and 
(4) to address supply chain vulnerabilities. (Industrial Base Fund, 2011) 
With a similar mandate to DPA Title III, IBAS conducts projects to build industrial 
capabilities to support DoD priorities. IBAS has both an open Broad Agency Announcement 
(BAA) and the Cornerstone OT Authority to support a broad range of industrial base 
requirements (Industrial Policy, n.d.-a). IBAS has ranged from $10 to $100 million in 
appropriations annually, depending on congressional adds, and has conducted a wide array of 
projects ranging from updating naval propulsion foundry and electron beam welding to 
munitions and missile improvements (Defense and Aerospace Competitive Intelligence Service, 
2019). 
Potential Future Uses 
IBAS is an active program that will continue to receive funding for industrial base 
projects. IBAS does not have a clause in its BAA or OT like DPA Title III explicitly including 
Canadian or other non–U.S.-headquartered firms, but there is no explicit restriction either. Firms 
based or headquartered in allied or partner countries are currently eligible to join the 
Cornerstone OTA, where the majority of IBAS contract opportunities are posted, on a case-by-
case basis. Designating NTIB countries as eligible for IBAS projects through a DFARS clause or 
by changing the DPA definition of domestic source would create a number of new eligible firms 
to help strengthen the U.S. defense industrial base.  
Recommendations 
• The DoD should consider creating and adding a DFARS clause to the IBAS BAA and 
Cornerstone OT making companies based in NTIB countries eligible to compete for 
IBAS opportunities to reflect the fact that they are already part of the U.S. industrial 
base. 
• The DoD should advertise and encourage NTIB-based companies to join the 
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Trusted Capital Management  
Current Use 
Trusted Capital Management (TCM) is one of the newest DoD efforts to strengthen the 
defense industrial base. After several previous aborted efforts, TCM formally launched in late 
2020 with the creation of its digital marketplace. The overall objective of TCM is to reduce the 
vulnerability of high-technology start-ups funded by venture capital or private equity to funding 
from sources of adversarial capital, principally from China. Chinese technology priority areas in 
recent years have included many high-tech areas such as robotics, autonomy, and artificial 
intelligence. In addition to funding domestic sources of innovation in these areas, Chinese-
based private equity and venture funds have invested in U.S.-based start-ups. Some of these 
investments have been shielded from easy discovery by start-ups. In response to some publicly 
revealed instances of adversarial investment, the DoD created TCM (Trusted Capital, n.d.). 
TCM is intended to create a trusted clearinghouse for companies and investors to 
conduct business free of potential adversarial investment. This effort is still in its early stages, 
but approximately 50 venture capital firms and companies have been vetted, and additional 
firms are in the pipeline (McLeary, 2021). 
Potential Future Uses 
TCM was created first and foremost for U.S. companies and investors, but there has 
always been an appreciation for non-U.S. companies and investors in allied and partner 
countries given the global nature of investment and technology. To that end, TCM is open to 
venture capital (VC) funds and companies based in other countries as long as they go through 
the same vetting process of other firms in the trusted capital marketplace and are currently on a 
DoD contract.2 
In addition, there is strong DoD interest in the development of TCM-like regimes in 
partner and allied countries or even in organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO). These could develop over time because U.S. allies are facing the same 
adversarial challenge of Chinese investments in their markets.  
Recommendations  
• The DoD should promote TCM to allied- or partner-based VC firms and companies 
focused on DoD business. 
• The DoD and State should work with allied governments and NATO to establish TCM-
like organizations in their respective countries or jurisdictions. 
Conclusions  
Allies and partners have long played a productive role in our defense acquisition system 
and have contributed to the U.S. defense industrial base. Given the common threat that we face 
in our respective supply chains, it is imperative to eliminate exposure to Chinese suppliers in 
critical national security areas. It makes little sense, however, to reshore all industrial capacity in 
a Buy America “Only” approach. Instead, we should focus first and foremost on those 
manufacturing areas where we are most vulnerable to China. In that effort, there are numerous 
manufacturing and resource areas where we can work with our close allies and partners to help 
achieve that common goal. From mining and chemicals to microelectronics and hypersonics, 
 
2. The latter requirement can be challenging for many start-ups, however, because current Small 
Business Administration rules do not permit foreign firms to compete for early-stage opportunities such as 
Small Business Innovation Research funding.  
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government and industry partnerships are synergistic and mutually beneficial for parties 
involved.  
The focus, therefore, should be on actions to foster true international industrial 
collaboration. That is done through actual participation in defense programs. Interestingly, there 
is a surprising amount of that happening right under our noses. Leonardo partnered with Boeing 
to win the Huey helicopter replacement program; Saab partnered with Boeing to win the Air 
Force T-X deal; SAIC partnered with Singapore’s ST Engineering and Belgium’s CMI Defence 
to prototype a light tank for the Army; Fincantieri Marinette Marine’s won the Navy’s Future 
Frigate program and the Army OMFV partnerships described above; and the list goes on and on 
(Judson, 2018). Not all of these partnerships have been or will be successful, but they create 
more competition for the DoD customer and lead to more industrial base resilience. And that, 
ultimately, is the goal.  
We need to create opportunity spaces for companies to operate within groups of “trusted 
communities,” to borrow a phrase from the treaties. The preceding has detailed how we have 
started to build these communities, but there is a long way to go. The NTIB is best postured to 
become one of those trusted communities. Whether NTIB companies are small or medium-
sized enterprises operating exclusively in one of these countries or if they are subsidiaries of 
U.S.-headquartered primes, these companies are now part of one industrial base. The RDP 
MOU countries are a different trusted community, and we can build on these over time.  
In sum, reframing acquisition processes and program to more effectively include partner 
and allied government and industry participation is ultimately a win-win proposition for all parties 
involved. Pursuing programs, initiatives, and recommendations like those described in this 
paper will help to provide a concrete foundation for the future of international industrial 
collaboration and will build industrial resilience we need to face the national security challenges 
of today and tomorrow.  
Summary Table of Recommendations  
Area  Recommendation 
General 
• The DoD should promote current DoD 5000 series processes for 
incorporating allied and partner companies’ technologies and systems 
into DoD programs. 
• The DoD should improve the ability of acquisition professionals to 
develop requirements documents that facilitate the early involvement of 
allied and partner companies in DoD programs (e.g., avoid citing 
classified, U.S.-only documents in either informal or formal requests for 
information or solicitations where possible). 
• The DoD should facilitate communications between U.S. subsidiary 
firms performing on DoD contracts and their parent foreign firms in 
areas of engineering with direct impact on the conduct of the system 
being developed or fielded (e.g., working with U.S. government export 
control organizations to authorize appropriate engineer-to-engineer 
engagement throughout the program life cycle). 
• The DoD should reexamine its approach to ICPs to identify different 
types of cooperative opportunities leading to a new generation of 
programs in the coming years. 
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Area  Recommendation 
RDP MOUs 
• The administration would be well served to formally articulate their 
support for RDP MOUs as part of their emphasis to strengthen 
relationships with allies and partners. 
• The DoD or Congress should request an analysis of the impact of RDP 
MOU countries’ contributions to the U.S. defense industrial base 
through participation in DoD programs and the purchase of U.S. 
defense systems through foreign military or direct commercial sales. 
• The DoD should work to increase awareness of and educate acquisition 
professionals across the services about the Buy America exemption for 
RDP MOU countries and the Canadian DPSA DFARS clause to help 
spur additional competition and innovative solutions in the U.S. defense 
industrial base. 
SoSAs 
• The DoD should conduct a review of SoSAs with partner countries to 
determine the future of SoSAs, specifically how these (and any future) 
arrangements could be adapted to make them more relevant for today’s 
global industrial security challenges. 
NTIB 
• Conduct rule making and establish DFARS clauses focused on 
facilitating NTIB participation in solicitations for industrial base 
opportunities such as DPA Title III, IBAS, and other appropriate 
programs. 
• Educate the acquisition workforce on the use of NTIB clauses for use in 
programs across the DoD. 
• Advertise these NTIB-inclusive opportunities to NTIB countries and 
trade associations to facilitate additional solutions to U.S. industrial 
base challenges. 
DPA Title III 
• The DoD and Canada should promote the ability for Canadian-based 
firms to contribute to DPA Title III projects. 
• The DoD should submit a legislative proposal to amend the DPA to 
include all NTIB countries to reflect the fact that they are already part of 
the U.S. industrial base and make their respective industrial capabilities 
available to strengthen that base. 
IBAS 
• Conduct rule-making and establish DFARS clauses focused on 
facilitating NTIB participation and membership in opportunities such as 
OT consortia, DPA Title III, IBAS, and other appropriate programs. 
• The DoD should advertise and encourage NTIB-based companies to 
join the Cornerstone OTA and to develop solutions to meet IBAS 
solicitations in the coming months. 
TCM 
• The DoD should promote TCM to allied- or partner-based VC firms and 
companies focused on DoD business. 
• The DoD and the Department of State should work with allied 
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